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CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent
current aspects of transnational law. The digest includes cases
that apply established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and
references are given for further research.
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1. ADMIRALTY
CARRIER WHO EMPLOYS

STEVEDORE UNDER A LONG-TERM CONTRACT IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE TO CARGO OWNER FOR STEVEDORE'S
MISHANDLING OF CARGO EVEN AFTER UNLOADING AND STORAGE

Plaintiff, owner of a cargo of tin bars, brought suit against defendants, the carrier of the cargo and the carrier's stevedore,
upon learning that five bundles of tin had disappeared following
,unloading and storage. Defendant carrier contended that it had
discharged its obligations under the contract of carriage by making constructive delivery of goods to the stevedore's pier and by
giving due notice of the arrival to the owner-who did not call for
the goods during the allotted "free time." Although acknowledging that defendant-carrier had discharged its duties under the bill
of lading, and was not liable for breach of contract, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York nevertheless held
that defendant-carrier was vicariously liable for the negligence of
the stevedore. The court justified its decision on the grounds that
defendant-carrier was in a better position than plaintiff-cargoowner to protect itself, by contract or insurance, against the negligence of stevedore. Had the statute of limitations not run, the
court noted, defendant-carrier could have brought a cross-claim
for indemnification against the stevedore. Significance-This decision settles a dispute among lower courts by holding that the
carrier continues to be responsible for the safety of stored goods
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even after the expiration of "free time" alloted to the consignee to
accept delivery. Philipp Bros. Metal Corp. v. SS Rio Iguazu, 498
F. Supp. 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
VESSEL OWNER DENIED

DUTY REMISSION

BECAUSE OF PROCEDURAL

FAILURE IN FILINGS WITH CUSTOMS SERVICE

Plaintiff, owner of a United States vessel, brought suit under
section 466(b)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930 to recover duties assessed on repairs made to the vessel while overseas. Plaintiff
based its claim on previous filings for remission of duties pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 4.14 of the Customs Regulations and on filings
for protest for the remission of foreign repair duties pursuant to
19 U.S.C. § 1514. Defendant maintained first, that the filing for
remission was faulty because it was not filed within 90 days after
the posting of notice of liquidation (final duty assessment). Defendant also contended that the suit was barred because it was
not filed within the 180 day statute of limitations provided by 28
U.S.C. § 2631(a). The Customs Court agreed with all of the defendant's contentions and granted its motion to dismiss the claim for
lack of jurisdiction. Significance-In finding that both of plaintiff's filings were faulty, the court noted that plaintiff's failure to
file the required evidence in a timely fashion after the filing for
remission permitted defendant to liquidate the entry without notifying plaintiff of a determination of its remission petition.
American Export Lines, Inc. v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1320
(Cust. Ct. 1980).
WIFE OF HARBOR WORKER INJURED NONFATALLY IN STATE TERRITORIAL WATERS MAY MAINTAIN

ACTION FOR Loss OF HUSBAND'S

SOCIETY

A harbor worker injured nonfatally while working aboard a vessel in New York waters sued the shipowner alleging negligence
and unseaworthiness. On the authority of Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 949 (1964), the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, denied the injured worker leave to amend the complaint to add his
wife as a plaintiff for loss of society. Reasoning that Sea-Land
Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), had sapped the vitality of Igneri, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court reversed the Special Term's denial, and granted the motion
to amend. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The United
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States Supreme Court, holding that general maritime law afforded a remedy to the wife of a harbor worker injured nonfatally
for loss of her husband's society, upheld the court of appeals' ruling. Because it found no grounds to distinguish fatal from nonfatal injuries in authorizing recovery for loss of society, the Court
extended the Gaudet holding to provide relief for such loss to the
wife of a harbor worker. The Court ruled first, that the Death on
the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. § 76-768 (1975), did not
exclude federal maritime law as a source of relief for nonfatal injuries occurring within state territorial waters, and second, that
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1975), did not exclusively regulate
longshoremen's remedies. The Court thus concluded that neither
DOSHA nor the Jones Act denied a right to recover in this case.
Significance-This decision recognizes the right of the wife of a
harbor worker to recover for loss of society when her husband is
injured, but not killed, as the result of negligence of the shipowner in a maritime accident. American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 100 S. Ct. 1673 (1980).
2. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
CORPORATION MAY QUALIFY FOR TAX TREATMENT AS A WESTERN
HEMISPHERE TRADE CORPORATION EVEN THOUGH INCIDENTAL
PURCHASES ARE MADE OUTSIDE THE HEMISPHERE

Plaintiff, elevator company, claiming to qualify for treatment as
a Western Hemisphere trade corporation (WHTC) under section
921 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), brought suit against
the defendant, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
(Commissioner), to recover alleged overpayments of federal corporate income taxes. To qualify as a WHTC, plaintiff had to establish that it was a corporation "all of whose business (other
than incidental purchases) is done in any country or countries in
North, Central or South America, or the West Indies." I.R.C. §
921. As a result of plaintiff's purchases of equipment manufactured by its European subsidiaries, the Commissioner determined
that plaintiff did not qualify as a WHTC during the fiscal years
1962 through 1969. The United States Court of Claims disagreed,
however, and rendered judgment for plaintiff-taxpayer. Even
though the transactions at issue accounted for as much as 15.7
percent of plaintiff's gross receipts for a single fiscal year, the
court concluded that they were "incidental" (i.e., minor in relation to the entire business, or nonrecurring or unusual in charac-
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ter) within the purview of Code section 921 and Treasury Regulation 1.921-1(a)(1). Turning next to the structure of the
transaction, the court ruled that plaintiff's procedure, in which
foreign purchases were first secured by the parent corporation
and then resold to plaintiff in the Western Hemisphere, was not a
sham because it was undertaken for the valid commercial purpose
of shifting to the parent the risk of loss during transit. Significance-This decision clarifies the definition of "incidental
purchases" within section 921 of the Internal Revenue Code, and
exposes a procedural loophole that allows a WHTC to reduce its
extra-hemispherical purchases by purchasing through a parent
corporation located in the Western Hemisphere. Otis Elevator
Co. v. United States, 618 F.2d 712 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
3. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
IMPORTATION OR RECEIPT OF GOODS FROM THE UNITED STATES CONFIRMED BY TELEX TO PLAINTIFF IN UNITED STATES INSUFFICIENT
CONTACTS TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL JURISDICTION UNDER FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

Plaintiff, a New York corporation, sued defendants, a Syrian
government agency and a Syrian shipping company, for demurrage on a cargo of rice delivered by plaintiff from California to
Syria. Defendant agency had imported or otherwise received the
foodstuffs or chemicals delivered by plaintiff from the United
States; both it and the defendant shipping company had telexed
plaintiff in the United States guaranteeing demurrage on the
cargo. The District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted defendant's motion to dismiss because there were insufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). After
finding as a matter of fact that the negotiations for the cargo had
occurred in Syria, and that the defendants were not parties to the
transportation contract, the court concluded as a matter of law
that there was no nexus between any activities of the defendants
in the United States and the telex concerning payment of demurrage incurred in Syria. Relying on Thomas P. Gonzdlez Corp. v.
Consejo Nacional de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980)
and on East Europe Domestic International Sales Corp. v.
Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the use of international communications constituted sufficient purposeful activity to invoke personal jurisdic-
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tion, or that such use had a "direct effect" in New York simply
because it may injure a New York domiciled corporation. Mindful
that the second circuit in Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d
673 (2d Cir. 1979), had already established that the minimum
contacts doctrine applied to the FSIA, the instant court simply
refined this analysis by providing that a United States court has
personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant under the FSIA
only when there is (1) evidence of continuous and systematic activities in the United States; (2) evidence of corporate agents regularly doing business in the United States; or (3) evidence that
the defendant has exercised the privilege of, or benefitted from
the protection of, conducting business in the United States. Following Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp.
1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), which held that there must be a nexus between the forum and the facts giving rise to the cause of action in
order to exercise personal jurisdiction, the instant court concluded that such a nexus was lacking in the facts of the instant
case. Significance-Thisdecision follows a line of cases finding no
evidence of activity of a foreign defendant, or its agents, in the
United States. Gemini Shipping Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org., 496
F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
IMPORTER HAS STANDING TO SUE UNDER THE ANTI-DUMPING ACT

Plaintiff, an importer of decorative foliage, charged that defendants violated the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72, by
importing and selling foliage in the United States at prices substantially less than market value. Defendants moved for summary
judgment, asserting that only domestic manufacturers have
standing to sue under the Act. The district court denied defendants' motion, noting that the broad language of the Act granted
standing to "any person injured in his business or property by
reason of any violation" of the Act. Although recognizing the Act
was created to protect United States manufacturers from unfair
competition due to cheaper European goods, the court found that
allowing this importer to sue would promote the "genial policy"
of fostering fair competition in United States markets. Significance-This decision provides that some domestic importers, in
addition to domestic manufacturers, now have standing to sue
under the Anti-Dumping Act. Jewell Foliage Co. v. Uniform
Overseas Florida,497 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
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OFFICERS OF A UNITED STATES GENERAL PARTNERSHIP WITH A MI-

NORITY OWNERSHIP BY ITALIAN CITIZENS ARE NOT AGENTS OF A FOREIGN PRINCIPAL UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT

Plaintiffs, members of an Italian commercial fishing partnership, sought a declaratory judgment that certain agreements with
defendant United States corporation and its officers were void
and unenforceable. Both parties had entered into an agreement
forming a general partnership in the United States for the construction and operation of fishing vessels. The agreement provided that plaintiffs would possess a twenty-five percent interest
in the enterprise, and that defendant's officers would conduct political lobbying in an attempt to secure more favorable fishing
rights for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also sought a stay of arbitration
pending the outcome of this action, while defendant cross-moved
to stay this action pending arbitration. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York ruled in favor of defendant and held that the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938, which "proscribes the payment
of fees that are contingent on the success of political lobbying,"
did not render the partnership agreements illegal or unenforceable. First, the court found that the corporation was not plaintiff's agent because plaintiff's minority owners did not "control"
it. Second, the court determined that the agreement in question
did not provide for any remuneration contingent upon successful
lobbying. Third, the court stated that an agreement by a chief
executive officer of a United States corporation to engage in advocacy of beneficial legislation did not violate public policy and was
a valid exercise of first amendment rights. Last, the court held
that the parties' agreement for arbitration of disputes was enforceable because a "private contract dispute" did not fall within
the purview of the Fishery Act, which gives district courts exclusive jurisdiction over actions arising under it. Significance-This
decision holds that a foreign principal must own more than a
twenty-five percent interest in a United States corporation to exert enough "control" to qualify as an agent under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act. Michele Amoruso E. Figli v. Fisheries
Development, 499 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

